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The organization of the agricultural export sector in Israel has changed dramatically in 
the last decade. Motivated by government policy to decrease public intervention in the 
economy and to privatize state monopolies, the agricultural export sector was 
reformed. The two main aspects of these reforms were (1) the abolition of statutory 
export monopolies, and (2) the privatization of export operations. Exports were 
opened up to competition by granting export licenses to private firms while parastatal 
monopoly exporters either ceased export operations or had to begin competing with 
these private firms. 
 
The liberalization of the agricultural export sector caused a drastic change in industry 
structure with potentially far-reaching consequences for conduct and performance. 
Economic theory does not provide an unequivocal answer to the question of how to 
best organize exports from the welfare point of view of a single country. Both 
centralized and competitive systems have their advantages and disadvantages. 
Theoretically, centralized marketing by a statutory organization may maximize the 
welfare of the export country if the centralized organization is able to exercise market 
power on export markets and to exploit economies of scale. On the other hand, there 
are certain potential losses associated with control and incentive problems in 
organizations that are not exposed to competition. If the losses from centralization are 
greater than the gains that can be realized, the ‘free market’ alternative is optimal. The 
far-reaching reforms in the Israeli agricultural export sector offer the opportunity to 
analyze the performance of alternative forms of agricultural export organization. 
  
The reforms in the organization of agricultural exports were introduced gradually, 
taking a few years to encompass most agricultural exports. Before the reforms, two 
State Trading Enterprises were responsible for all horticultural exports from Israel: the 
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  1Citrus Marketing Board of Israel (CMBI) exported all citrus fruit while Agrexco (a 
company owned by growers and by the government) exported all other fruits and 
vegetables. Reforms commenced in 1991 with a comprehensive reform of the citrus 
sector, including the abolition of single-desk exports and the privatization of export 
operations. Agrexco and a few commercial companies took over citrus exports. The 
CMBI continued to exist and perform some regulatory functions, generic promotion 
and R&D but it ceased selling operations. In 2004, the CMBI was united with three 
other boards to form the Plant Production and Marketing Board. Starting from 
1992/93, exporters could apply for export licenses for specific fruits and vegetables in 
addition to Agrexco, but only if they were able to demonstrate that they would export 
at least 30% of total exports of the specific product. Later on, this condition was 
abolished, but Agrexco continued to export a large share of Israeli fruits and 
vegetables. For flowers, the export monopoly had already been abolished more than 
20 years prior, but the Flower Board had kept the exclusive concession for exports to 
the main market, the flower auctions in Holland, while Agrexco provided the logistic 
services for flowers sold through the auctions. At the end of the 90s, the flower sector 
was also reformed and exports to the auctions were opened to additional exporters.  
 
There are other countries which have abolished agricultural export monopolies. The 
South African Ministry of Agriculture commissioned a report to investigate the 
marketing of agricultural products under various marketing boards. The Kassier 
Report (1992) - named after the chairman of the inquiry committee - concluded that 
the activities performed under the authority of the Marketing Act did not achieve the 
goals and objectives of the act, e.g. efficient production was not promoted and 
producer prices were stabilized in certain industries but income was not. Vink and 
Kirsten (2000) argue that the deregulation of South African agriculture has resulted in 
a net welfare gain to the commercial agricultural sector and present empirical 
evidence in support of this argument. Mather (2003) investigated the attempts made 
by South African citrus growers to cooperate and establish voluntary regulations after 
liberalization of exports in 1997. According to this report, the impact of liberalization 
for growers has been mixed. Although growers can select an exporter as a result of the 
liberalization, returns have declined and appear to have become more volatile. 
Monopoly exports of citrus and tomatoes from Morocco were abolished at the end of 
the 80s, but some cooperation in exports continued afterwards. Moroccan exporters 
cooperate in export logistics and even export together to more distant markets (Kachel 
1996). Aloui (not dated) argues, in a comparative analysis of Moroccan strawberry 
and tomato exports, that one of the main reasons for the success of tomato exports is 
the high integration of export operations after the abolition of monopoly exports. 
 
The experience of other countries with export liberalization is mixed. In Israel, 
different sectors also developed differently after the reforms. Previous research shows 
that in the citrus sector, main performance indicators continued to decline after the 
reform (Kachel 2003). On the other hand, vegetable exports have increased 
  2substantially in recent years following the liberalization of exports. Differences in the 
reform process and in the resulting market structure might be one reason for these 
observed differences in performance. In all sectors, exports are now carried out by 
private exporters and by Agrexco. But sectors differ in (1) arrangements customary 
before the reforms, (2) market structure in export markets, and (3) horizontal and 
vertical (for example the ownership of packing stations) market structure in the 
market for “export services” in Israel.  
 
In this paper, we report a study of the success of reforms in the agricultural export 
sector in Israel. A detailed analysis of the changes in the export regime and their 
consequences focuses on a few main export products: grapefruit (the main citrus fruit 
exported), avocado (the main fruit exported beside citrus) and pepper (the main 
vegetable exported). We begin with a short description of the development of 
agricultural production and exports. We then compare economic indicators describing 
the structure and performance of the selected agricultural export sectors preceding and 
following the reforms. The evaluation of each product is followed by an econometric 
analysis to examine the claim that centralized exporting can increase growers’ 
revenues. Finally, we analyze the functioning of the market for export services after 
the reforms. 
 
2. The Development of Agricultural Production and 
Exports
1 
The value of agricultural production declined in the 80s as a result of a large decline 
in output prices paralleling a substantial increase in production. During the 90s, the 
value of agricultural production was more or less steady - around 15 billion NIS (in 
2004 prices). Recent years have witnessed an increase in the output value to about 19 
billion NIS in 2005 (Figure 1). Main outlets for agricultural production are the local 
market and the processing industry. Exports account for 25% of agricultural output (in 
2005). Increasing agricultural exports are responsible for nearly half of the output 
value increase observed since 2000. Favorable exchange rates in the main export 
markets (a strong Euro) account for part of the increase in export value. It is likely 
that the liberalization of exports has also contributed to the increase. 
 
Crops comprise about 60% of total agricultural output, with horticultural crops (fruit, 
vegetables and flowers) being the main products. Fruits (including citrus) and 
vegetables account for 43% of the agricultural output (Figure 2).  
                                                 
1 Data source for all data presented in this section: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). All nominal 
values were deflated by the CPI (Consumer Price Index) and are reported in 2004 prices. The figures 
present the agricultural output value according to use (domestic market, export, industry, other). 
"Other" stands for "intermediate produce" which is agricultural produce that re-enters the agricultural 
production process (e.g., locally grown barley used for livestock feed). Data on intermediate produce 
also include data on the destruction of agricultural produce and, as of 1986 - sales to Judea, Samaria 
and the Gaza Area. 
  3Figure 1 























































































The various horticultural sectors are characterized by different structures and 
development. The vegetable sector produces mainly for the domestic market which 
generates 63% of the output value (2005). Exports account for 31% while only a small 
share of vegetable production is supplied to the processing industry. In recent years, 
the vegetable sector has undergone very rapid development, driven by an increase in 
sales to the local and export markets (Figure 3). 
 
  4Figure 3  
 Vegetable Output Value (incl. Potatoes and 








































































In the past, citrus had been one of the main agricultural sectors and one of Israel’s 
main export products. In 2004 however, citrus accounted for just 4% of the 
agricultural output and 9% of agricultural exports. The output value of citrus fruit 
declined markedly in the 80s, reflecting a decline in production and exports and a 
crisis in the sector, which led to the extensive reforms. After the abolition of 
centralized export operations by the CMBI in 1991, citrus exports (and output value) 
increased somewhat but in the mid-nineties, the trend of decline in output and exports 
resumed. In recent years, citrus exports have recovered somewhat, influenced by 
favorable exchange rates and especially by an increased demand for Israeli grapefruit 
following extensive hurricane damage to grapefruit production in Florida (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 



































































Remark: For citrus, each year relates to the season beginning the year before, e.g. 1984 = season 
1983/84. 
 
  5In the past, the citrus sector was very much export-oriented. In the second half of the 
80s, less than 10% of citrus production was sold in the domestic market. Citrus fruit 
that did not satisfy the standards of the fresh fruit market were processed. In recent 
years, the value of citrus fruit sold in the domestic market is approaching that of citrus 
fruit exported as fresh fruit. 
 
In contrast to citrus, other fruits are produced mainly for domestic consumption 
while the processing industry accounts for a very small share of total production. 
Output values for fruits stagnated in the 90s but have increased in recent years. Fruit 
exports have also begun to increase after a long period of stagnation (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5  





































































Flowers are an export product. Until recently, exports accounted for about 85% of the 
output value. Since 2000, the local market for flowers has developed substantially, 
and the share of exports in the total output value of flowers has decreased to 77% 
(2005). The value of flower exports declined at the end of the 90s after a period of 
stagnation, but has recovered in recent years (Figure 6). 
 
Israeli exports of unprocessed agricultural products are comprised almost exclusively 
of horticultural products. Here, we focus on citrus, fruit and vegetable exports and 
provide a detailed analysis of the most important export product in each product 
category. Exports in each of these sectors have developed very differently. Citrus 
exports have declined markedly, exports of other fruits are more or less stable with an 
increase in recent years, and vegetable exports have increased substantially (Figure 7). 
In recent years (avg. 2003-2005), avocado has accounted for about 35% of total fruit 
exports (not including citrus), a decline from 65% at the end of the 80s. The most 
important vegetable exported is pepper, accounting for 31% of the export value of 
vegetable exports and even more than that in the last two years. The export of 
vegetables in recent years has increased mainly due to the increases in pepper and 
potato exports. Grapefruit exports account for 48% of total citrus exports. 
  6Figure 6 
Flower Output Value




































































Figure 7  
Export Value According to Sectors





































































3. Comparative Analysis over Time 
In this section, the development of the avocado, pepper and citrus sectors is studied. 
We compare economic indicators in the decade before the reforms to the decade 
afterwards. Our objective is to evaluate the success of the reforms in the different 
sectors. 
 
The analysis is based on output data (source: CBS) and import data of the European 
Union (source: EUROSTAT). Output quantities and values are reported according to 
output use (domestic market, export, industry, intermediate produce = other). We 
calculate unit values (value per metric ton of production) and use these unit values as 
an indicator for prices received by growers. These data are based chiefly on monthly 
reports from wholesalers, production boards, and industrial enterprises. The 
agricultural output value usually excludes board fees and marketing commissions 
  7(CBS). For output supplied to the domestic market and to the processing industry, 
values are reported at farm gate, whereas exports are reported as FOB (Free On 
Board) value. The CBS collects these data on a monthly and yearly basis. However, 
while the yearly data are verified and updated, the monthly data are not, and there are 
years in which there are substantial differences between the yearly and aggregated 
monthly data. Whenever possible, we use yearly data. 
 
EUROSTAT collects trade data from EU member states based on customs data 
supplied by the member state and data collected from trading firms for the trade 
between EU countries. We use import data to the EU15 - that is, total imports to the 
15 member states of the EU before the recent enlargement to 25 member states. We 
calculate unit values from data on import quantities and values. These unit values are 
an indication of import prices on a CIF (Cost Insurance Freight) basis. Note that these 
data may not be reliable because of the nature of the fruit and vegetable trade. Sales 
are often on a consignment basis and therefore, the final price is not known at the time 
of the customs declaration. In addition, unit values calculated for suppliers from the 
EU depend on the reliability of the data reported by traders.  
 
In this section, we compare output data and EU import data for Israel before and after 
the reforms in the selected sectors. In addition, we compare Israeli import quantities 
and prices to those of main competitors. To evaluate whether export liberalization has 
led to cost savings, we compare the difference between import prices (unit values on a 
CIF basis) and export prices (unit values on a FOB basis) before and after reforms. 
This difference only accounts for part of the marketing costs (mainly transportation 
and insurance). 
  
All nominal output values were deflated by the CPI and are reported in 2004 prices. 
EU trade data are presented in Euros and in real NIS. We use Euros for the 
comparison of import prices for Israeli products versus those of competitors in order 
to evaluate the effect of the liberalization on relative prices in export markets. 
  
3.1. The Avocado Sector 
Development of the Avocado Sector 
The avocado sector is characterized by important changes in the last decade. Agrexco 
was the only avocado exporter till 1998.
2 From export season 1998/99, additional 
companies began to export avocados. Nevertheless, exports are still very 
concentrated, with Agrexco accounting for about 70%, and two additional exporters 
for the balance. 
 
The avocado sector was in a crisis in the second half of the 80s. After a record harvest 
in 1986/87 (135,000 ton), production declined, parallel to a decrease in avocado prices 
                                                 
2 Till the mid-80s there was an additional avocado exporter (Hilron) competing with Agrexco. 
  8in export markets. As a result of the large drop in production, the output value also 
declined (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8 
 Avocado Output Value




































































Data Source: CBS. 
 
A comparison of output quantities and prices in the decade before the opening of 
exports to the seven years passed since the reforms reveals the following changes (see 
Table 1): 
•  Average export quantities are slightly lower (-3%), contrasting with an 
increase in domestic consumption of 112%. The increase in domestic 
consumption is caused by a large increase in per capita consumption (from 
3.5 kg to 6.2 kg per year) in addition to the population increase. 
•  Avocado production increased (+34%) parallel to the increase in domestic 
consumption. 
•  Average output values per metric ton for exported avocados are nearly 
identical in both periods. Average output values for avocados sold on the 
domestic market also did not change. The value of 1 mt exported is 
substantially higher than the value of 1 mt sold on the domestic market.  
•  Overall, average grower prices (as indicated by the unit output value) are 
somewhat lower in the period after liberalization (-11%). This decline may be 
overstated because data indicate that there was no collection of price 
information for avocado sold to the processing industry and to intermediate 
uses in most of the period before liberalization; instead, the much higher price 
of the domestic market was used to derive the value of avocado supplied to 
these uses. 
•  The total value of avocado production increased by 20%. 
  9Table 1: Development of the Avocado Sector (Average per Season) 
   Production  
Domestic 
Market  Industry  Export  Intermediate  
Quantity in mt          
Avg. 88/9-97/8 57,756  19,011  715  36,991  1,039 
Avg. 98/9-04/5 77,663  40,339  1,081  35,763  481 
Change in % 34%  112%  51%  -3%  -54% 
Real Value in 1000 NIS          
Avg. 88/9-97/8 248,400  53,770 2,290  189,194  3,147 
Avg. 98/9-04/5 297,917  113,556  403  182,813  1,146 
Change in % 20%  111%  -82%  -3%  -64% 
Real Unit Value in NIS/mt         
Avg. 88/9-97/8 4,301  2,828  3,202  5,115  3,027 
Avg. 98/9-04/5 3,836  2,815  373  5,112  2,384 
Change in % -11%  -0%  -88%  -0%  -21% 
Remark: Till 1994, no separate price was collected for avocado supplied to the processing 
industry and to intermediate uses. Reported prices were identical to those in the domestic 
market. This explains the large decline in the price of avocado for processing. 
Data Source: CBS. 
 
Avocado Imports to the European Union 
The EU (EU15) is the main market for Israeli avocados, accounting for about 96% of 
the export value (CBS). Israel is one of four main avocado suppliers to the EU; the 
others are Spain, South Africa and Mexico. There are a few additional, smaller 
suppliers, which have increased their market share in recent years - Kenia, Chile and 
Peru. The Israeli export season is from October to April. The main competitors in this 
period are Spain and Mexico. Israel’s market share in this period is 40% (average 




A comparison of avocado import data to the EU for Israel and its main competitors in 
the decade before reorganization of exports and in the years afterwards enables 
preliminary conclusions about the influence of this reform on export performance 
(Table 2). We compare the period after the opening of exports (Oct 1998 to Apr 2005) 
to the decade prior to it. The data are monthly averages for the Israeli export season 
(Oct-Apr) in both periods. 
  
                                                 
3 Total avocado imports to the EU are calculated as the sum of imports from extra-EU countries and 
imports from Spain. According to FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) data, Spain is the only 
commercial avocado producer in the EU. We therefore assume that imports from other EU countries 
are re-exports.  
  10Table 2: Avocado Imports to the EU in Oct-Apr (Monthly Average) 
   Spain Israel    Mexico  Extra-EU 
Extra- EU 
+ Spain 
Quantity in mt                
10/88-4/98 2,811  4,419  1,739 7,363  10,174 
10/98-4/2005 4,133  4,948  1,624 8,374  12,508 
Change in %  47%  12%  -7% 14%  23% 
Value in 1000 Euro             
10/88-4/98 3,140  5,111  2,030 8,640  11,780 
10/98-4/2005 5,460  6,477  2,545 11,630  17,090 
Change in %  74%  27%  25% 35%  45% 
Euro/mt                
10/88-4/98 1,117  1,157  1,167 1,173  1,158 
10/98-4/2005 1,321  1,309  1,567 1,389  1,366 
Change in %  18%  13%  34% 18%  18% 
Real Value in 1000 NIS                
10/88-4/98 18,220  30,291  11,836 51,125  69,344 
10/98-4/2005 26,428  30,983  12,516 56,368  82,796 
Change in %  45%  2%  6% 10%  19% 
Real Unit Value in NIS/mt                
10/88-4/98 6,483  6,855  6,807 6,943  6,816 
10/98-4/2005 6,394  6,261  7,707 6,731  6,620 
Change in %  -1%  -9%  13% -3%  -3% 
Unit values are weighted monthly averages. Extra-EU = Imports from countries not belonging 
to the EU15. 
Data Source: EUROSTAT (the data are for EU15 countries). 
 
Avocados supplied to the EU originate mainly in countries outside the EU. The only 
EU country producing substantial quantities of avocados for export is Spain. The 
increase in average monthly EU avocado imports by 23% suggests an increase in 
avocado demand (Table 2). The imports from Spain increased by 47%, compared to 
an increase of only 12% of avocado imports from Israel. In contrast, avocado imports 
from Mexico declined. Imports from Mexico complete the avocado supply during 
periods with low supply from Spain and Israel. In recent years, imports from 
additional suppliers (Chile, Peru) in the counter-season have increased, and may have 
caused the decline in imports from Mexico.  
 
Unit values provide an indication of import prices. The average unit value in Euros for 
EU avocado imports increased by 18%. Mexico managed to increase import prices for 
its avocados by a third while prices for Israeli and Spanish avocados increased much 
less (13%. and 18%, respectively). A translation of import values to real NIS reveals a 
decline in real import prices for Israeli avocados (-9%). 
  
A comparison of Israeli import prices to those of its main competitors in the period 
before and after the opening of exports to competition does not indicate a relative 
change in prices that may be attributed to competition among Israeli exporters and a 
resulting decline in bargaining power. Unit values for Spanish and Israeli avocados 
  11are similar in both periods with slightly higher average prices for Israel (the 
differences are not statistically significant at the 5% level
4). Unit values for Israeli and 
Mexican avocados were similar in the first period while Mexican prices are 
significantly higher in the second period. We cannot explain the reason for this 
change without further research (a possible reason is an increase in Mexican avocado 
quality). It is not reasonable to attribute this change to increased competition among 
Israeli exporters - in that case we would expect a similar change in relative prices 
compared to Spain.  
 
Table 3: Comparison of Unit Import Values for Avocado in Euro/mt  
(Simple Average, Oct-Apr) 






of Obs.  
10/88 – 4/1998  1,168  1,236  1,181  68 55 70 
10/98 – 4/2005  1,353 1,378 1,504  25  -126  49 
Remark: For the price comparison with competitors we use simple monthly averages to 
compare price levels during the Israeli export season without taking into account differences 
in the monthly distribution of supplies (e.g. higher supplies of Mexican avocado at the 
beginning of the Israeli season when prices are generally high). Only the price difference with 
Mexico is statistically significant (printed in bold).  
Data Source: EUROSTAT (the data are for EU15 countries). 
  
We examine the development of the margin between FOB export prices and CIF 
import prices for a first indication of possible cost savings in export operations 
resulting from liberalization. For Israeli avocados, the price difference declined 22% 
in the second period (Table 4). This may indicate success of the reform in increasing 
efficiency of export operations and a corresponding decline of marketing margins.  
  
Table 4: Comparison of Unit Values (CIF and FOB) for Israeli Avocados   
(Weighted Average, Oct-Apr)  
   
Real CIF Prices 
in NIS/mt  
Real FOB Prices 
in NIS/mt   FOB/CIF  CIF-FOB  
10/88 – 4/1998  6,855 5,332  0.78  1,522  
10/98 - 4/2005  6,261 5,079  0.81  1,182  
change in %  -9% -5%  4%  -22% 
Remark: We also performed the comparison of CIF and FOB unit values based on yearly 
CBS data which are updated and probably more accurate than monthly data. In this case, the 
data indicate an even larger decline in the CIF-FOB margin after liberalization.   
Data Sources: EUROSTAT, CBS.    
  
                                                 
4 All reported statistical tests were performed at the 5% significance level. 
  123.2. The Citrus Sector 
Development of the Citrus Sector 
After the establishment of Israel, citrus production expanded rapidly to a record 
production of 1.7 million mt in the mid-seventies. Production was export-oriented. 
The domestic market consumed only a small percentage of the production while fruit 
not suitable for fresh consumption was diverted to the processing industry. During the 
’80s, citrus exports declined by more than half (see Figure 4). The steep fall in exports 
and shrinking profitability of citrus growing led to increasing criticism of the 
operations of the CMBI. As a result, it was decided to cancel the Board's export and 
domestic marketing monopoly. In the 1991/92 season, the Board ceased selling 
operations and several commercial companies began exporting Israeli citrus for the 
first time. The domestic market was opened to competition in April 1991.  
 
The development of grapefruit production mirrors that of total citrus production: the 
decline in exports and production is simply smaller (Figure 9). Florida grapefruit 
production was hit hard in 2004/05 by hurricanes which caused long-term damage to 
the sector and, in turn, increased the prospects for Israeli grapefruit exports.  
 
Figure 9  
Grapefruit Output Value






































































Data Source: CBS (Each year relates to the season beginning the year before, e.g. 1984 = season 
1983/84.)   
   
We compare the last five seasons before the reform of the citrus sector to the average 
of the 14 seasons since then (Table 5). Because of the rapid decline of production and 
exports in the decade before the liberalization, we chose the short period of only five 
seasons immediately before liberalization.  
 
  13Table 5: Development of the Citrus Sector (Average per Season)  
   Production  
Domestic 
Market  Industry  Export  Intermediate  
Total Citrus                 
Quantity in mt               
Avg. 86/7-90/01  1,221,050  111,050  686,590  422,730  680 
Avg. 91/2-04/05  759,397  150,442  360,738  244,011  4,206 
Change in %  -38%  35%  -47%  -42%  519% 
Real Value in 1000 NIS  
Avg. 86/7-90/01  1,904,969  313,757  491,461  1,099,343  408 
Avg. 91/2-04/05  918,871  262,020  147,681  499,552  9,618 
Change in %  -52%  -16%  -70%  -55%  2256% 
Real Unit Value in NIS/mt   
Avg. 86/7-90/01  1,560  2,825  716  2,601  600 
Avg. 91/2-04/05  1,210  1,742  409  2,047  2,287 
Change in %  -22%  -38%  -43%  -21%  281% 
Grapefruit          
Quantity in mt               
Avg. 86/7-90/01  369,010  14,420  241,980  112,610  0 
Avg. 91/2-04/05  319,090  19,372  203,139  96,573  7 
Change in %  -14%  34%  -16%  -14%    
Real Value in 1000 NIS  
Avg. 86/7-90/01  517,343  35,813  172,959  308,571  0 
Avg. 91/2-04/05  310,251  29,725  84,401  196,115  10 
Change in %  -40%  -17%  -51%  -36%    
Real Unit Value in NIS/mt   
Avg. 86/7-90/01  1,402  2,484  715  2,740    
Avg. 91/2-04/05  972  1,534  415  2,031  1,361 
Change in %  -31%  -38%  -42%  -26%    
Data Source: CBS. 
 
The following are the main changes observed in the citrus sector after liberalization: 
•  The decline in production continued - citrus production after liberalization is 
lower by almost 40% compared to the five seasons immediately before 
liberalization. 
•  Production declined as a result of the decline in exports (in parallel, the 
supply to the processing industry also declined, as this is a by-product of fresh 
fruit production). 
•  Production supplied to the domestic market increased by 35%. Per capita 
citrus consumption hardly increased (from 24.6 kg to 25.2 kg), despite a 
substantial decline in citrus prices on the domestic market (as indicated by the 
unit values in Table 5). 
•  Unit output values declined substantially for all main uses (export, domestic 
market, industry). The percentage decline is lowest for export unit values           
(-21%). 
  14•  The percentage of production supplied to the processing industry declined 
(from 56% to 48%), the percentage supplied to the domestic market increased 
(from 9% to 20%), while the percentage exported declined slightly (from 35% 
to 32%).  
•  The changes in the grapefruit sector mirror those observed for all citrus. The 
main difference: the decline in production and exports for grapefruit is 
smaller. 
 
Overall, the performance of the Israeli citrus industry did not improve after 
liberalization. Production, exports and grower prices continued to decline. To 
investigate the reasons for this development and the role of export liberalization we 
chose grapefruit exports for a more detailed analysis. Grapefruits accounted for 28% 
of exports (value) before liberalization, and today, it is the main export product in the 
citrus sector with an average share of 39% in the period after liberalization and nearly 
50% in recent seasons. In addition, Israeli grapefruit accounts for significant market 
shares in export markets. 
 
Grapefruit Imports to the European Union 
We compare average import quantities and values to the EU during the supply season 
of the Israeli grapefruit (Sep-Jun). Monthly EU import data are only available from 
1988, therefore the period before liberalization comprises only four seasons (without 
the beginning of the first season).  
 
EU countries receive their grapefruit supplies mainly from countries outside the EU, 
with the exception of Spain which grows grapefruit for export. Additional EU imports 
from other EU countries are probably mainly re-exports. Total EU grapefruit 
consumption (Extra-EU + Spain) is slightly lower in the second period (Table 6). 
Imports from the two main suppliers, the US and Israel, declined – with a much larger 
decline in imports from Israel. The average market share of Israeli grapefruit 
decreased from 25% to 18%. On the other hand, imports from Turkey and Spain 
increased. The import unit value for Israeli citrus increased in Euro but decreased in 
real NIS. 
  
Unit values indicate that import prices for Israeli citrus are mostly lower than those of 
its main competitors, although the difference with Spain and Turkey is small (Table 
7). In contrast, US grapefruit obtained significantly higher prices in the period before 
liberalization. In the second period, the price premium for US grapefruit compared to 
Israeli grapefruit declined considerably but is still significant. The price for Israeli 
grapefruit also improved compared to Turkish grapefruit and Israeli import prices are 
higher in the second period. The price comparison indicates that there was an 
improvement in Israeli grapefruit prices relative to those of competitors in the period 
after liberalization of exports.   
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   Turkey USA   Israel   Spain    Extra-EU  Extra-EU 
+ Spain 
Quantity in mt                    
1/88-6/91 1,507  12,571  9,459  749 36,394 37,142 
9/91-6/2005 3,126  11,663  6,490  1,557 34,106  35,663 
Change in %  107%  -7%  -31%  108% -6%  -4% 
Value in 1000 Euro              
1/88-6/91 714  7,529  4,323  382 18,729 19,111 
9/91-6/2005 1,711  6,536  3,420  886 18,187 19,073 
Change in %  140%  -13%  -21%  132% -3%  0% 
Euro/mt           
1/88-6/91 474  599  457  510 515  515 
9/91-6/2005 547  560  527  569 533  535 
Change in %  15%  -6%  15%  12% 4%  4% 
Real Value in 1000 NIS        
1/88-6/91 4,860  51,699  29,555  2,589 127,657 130,246 
9/91-6/2005 8,523  33,690  17,649  4,532 93,847  98,379 
Change in %  75%  -35%  -40%  75% -26%  -24% 
Real Unit Value in NIS/mt        
1/88-6/91 3,225  4,113  3,125  3,459 3,508  3,507 
9/91-6/2005 2,727  2,889  2,720  2,910 2,752  2,759 
Change in %  -15%  -30%  -13%  -17% -22%  -21% 
Unit values are weighted monthly averages. Extra-EU = Imports from countries not belonging 
to EU15. 
Data Source: EUROSTAT (the data are for EU15 countries). 
 
Table 7: Comparison of Unit Import Values for Grapefruit in Euro/mt  
(Simple Average, Sep-Jun) 





Diff. w/  
Spain  
Number 
of Obs.  
1/88-6/1991 497  636  464  495 -33 -172  -31 30 
9/91-6/2005 534  585  540  570 16  -45 -30  122 
Remark: The price difference with Turkey is not statistically significant in either period, the 
difference with the US is significant in both periods, while the difference with Spain is 
significant in the second period only (significant differences are printed in bold). 
Data Source: EUROSTAT.   
A comparison of CIF import prices and FOB export prices for Israeli grapefruit in 
both periods points to an increase in the margin (Table 8). This result contradicts 
those reported by Kachel (2003) which indicated a decline in the margin after 
liberalization of exports.  Different observation periods and different data sources 
(CMBI instead of CBS) are probably responsible for the divergence. 
 
  16Table 8: Comparison of Unit Values (CIF and FOB) for Israeli Grapefruit    
  
Real CIF Prices 
in NIS/mt  
Real FOB Prices 
in NIS/mt     FOB/CIF      CIF-FOB 
Avg. 86/7-90/1 3,234  2,740  0.84  514 
Avg. 91/2-04/5 2,685  2,031  0.76  654 
Change in %  -17%  -26%  -10%  27% 
Remark: The calculation of unit values is based on seasonal data for FOB prices because 
monthly FOB data did not look very reliable. CIF prices are based on yearly data because 
monthly data for EU imports are only available from 1988.  
Data Sources: EUROSTAT, CBS. 
 
 
3.3. The Pepper Sector 
Development of the Pepper Sector 
The pepper sector has expanded impressively in the last decade, due to an increase in 
domestic consumption and especially exports (Figure 10). For pepper, exports were 
opened to competition gradually: in as early as 1991, a grower group in the south of 
the country (The Arava Growers) received an export license and started to compete 
with Agrexco. Exports were completely opened in the 1999/2000 season, inducing 
substantial entry into the pepper export business. Today, in addition to Agrexco, tens 
of export companies are exporting pepper and Agrexco's export share has declined to 
about 50%. In the following analysis, we compare these three distinctive periods. 
 







































































Data Source: CBS  
  
  17The main changes in the pepper sector are summarized below (see Table 9): 
•  Production increased substantially (from 48,000 mt in 1988-91 to 114,000 mt 
in 2000-05). 
•  Total domestic consumption of pepper increased, as did per capita 
consumption. In contrast, quantities supplied to the processing industry 
declined. 
•  Exports increased impressively from only about 3,000 mt in 1988-91 to 
40,000 mt in 2000-05. The increase in exports continues, with exports in 2005 
reaching 62,000 mt. 
•  The unit output value for exports is substantially higher than those obtained 
for other uses. 
•  The real unit export value has declined from period to period. The decrease 
from the first period (one exporter) to the second period (two exporters) is 
small (-3%). In the last period (many exporters), average real export prices 
declined an additional 6%. 
•  Despite this decline, average unit values for pepper production increased 
substantially as a result of the large increase in exports.  
 
Table 9: Development of the Pepper Sector (Average per Season) 
   Production  
Domestic 
Market   Industry  Export  Intermediate  
Quantity in mt                
Avg. 88-91  47,760 36,369 7,877 2,854  660
Avg. 92-99  72,282 55,865 5,642 9,085  1,690
Avg. 2000-2005  114,111 70,723 2,483 40,347  558
Change 92-99 / 88-91   51% 54% -28% 218%  156%
Change 00-05 / 92-99   58% 27% -56% 344%  -67%
Real Value in 1000 NIS            
Avg. 88-91  140,024 109,530 8,881 21,010  602
Avg. 92-99  196,019 124,803 5,642 65,003  571
Avg. 2000-2005  472,543 199,554 2,641 270,245  102
Change 92-99 / 88-91   40% 14% -36% 209%  -5%
Change 00-05 / 92-99   141% 60% -53% 316%  -82%
Real Unit Value in NIS/mt          
Avg. 88-91  2,932 3,012 1,127 7,363  912
Avg. 92-99  2,712 2,234 1,000 7,155  338
Avg. 2000-2005  4,141 2,822 1,064 6,698  183
Change 92-99 / 88-91   -8% -26% -11% -3%  -63%
Change 00-05 / 92-99   53% 26% 6% -6%  -46%
Data Source: CBS.    
 
  18Pepper Imports to the European Union 
A comparison of import quantities and prices of Israeli pepper in main export markets 
to those of its main competitors provides additional information on the performance 
of this sector. The EU is the main export market for Israeli pepper while the main 
competitors in this market are Spain and the Netherlands. We compare average import 
quantities and prices in the months November to May, which is the export season of 
Israeli pepper (Table 10). EU pepper imports from Israel increased substantially. 
Nevertheless, Israel is still a small pepper supplier to the EU market, with a share
5 of 
about 8% in total EU pepper imports in November to May. EU import quantities from 
Spain and the Netherlands increased even more than those from Israel, despite the 
large growth rates in Israeli exports.  
 
Table 10: Pepper Imports to the EU in Nov-May (Monthly Average) 
   Netherlands Israel  Spain  Total Imports
Quantity in mt   
(1) 1/88 - 5/91   5,035 213 19,897 28,890
(2) 11/91 - 5/99   8,570 1,069 30,531 44,056
(3) 11/99 - 5/2005  12,892 4,395 37,984 65,110
Change (2) / (1)  70% 402% 53% 52%
Change (3) / (2)  50% 311% 24% 48%
Value in 1000 Euro   
(1) 1/88 - 5/91   9,412 285 20,671 34,595
(2) 11/91 - 5/99   17,191 1,634 33,619 57,186
(3) 11/99 - 5/2005  27,173 7,773 50,789 99,156
Change (2) / (1)  83% 473% 63% 65%
Change (3) / (2)  58% 376% 51% 73%
Euro/mt   
(1) 1/88 - 5/91   1,869 1,338 1,039 1,197
(2) 11/91 - 5/99   2,006 1,528 1,101 1,298
(3) 11/99 - 5/2005  2,108 1,768 1,337 1,541
Change (2) / (1)  7% 14% 6% 8%
Change (3) / (2)  5% 16% 21% 19%
Real Value in 1000 NIS   
(1) 1/88 - 5/91   63,447 1,949 141,803 236,337
(2) 11/91 - 5/99   91,578 8,205 180,041 304,974
(3) 11/99 - 5/2005  131,031 38,758 245,669 481,857
Change (2) / (1)  44% 321% 27% 29%
Change (3) / (2)  43% 372% 36% 58%
Real Unit Value in NIS/mt   
(1) 1/88 - 5/91   12,602  9,136  7,127 8,181
(2) 11/91 - 5/99   10,686  7,673  5,897 6,922
(3) 11/99 - 5/2005  10,163  8,818  6,468 7,401
Change (2) / (1)  -15%  -16%  -17% -15%
Change (3) / (2)  -5%  15%  10% 7%
Unit values are weighted monthly averages.  
Data Source: EUROSTAT (the data are for EU15 countries). 
                                                 
5 Israel’s actual share in imports is probably somewhat higher because total imports include re-exports. 
On the other hand, part of the EU pepper consumption is produced locally and not imported; therefore 
import shares are higher than actual market shares. 
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Prices obtained for Israeli pepper (as indicated by unit import values) are lower than 
the prices for Dutch pepper but higher than prices for Spanish pepper (Table 11). Over 
the years, the price difference relative to Dutch pepper has declined, while the price 
difference relative to Spanish pepper has increased. All price differences are 
statistically significant. The price comparison indicates that the prices of Israeli 
pepper relative to those of its main competitors have improved. There is no indication 
of a price decline caused by increased competition among Israeli exporters.  
  
Table 11: Comparison of Unit Import Values for Pepper in Euro/mt  
(Simple Average, Nov-May) 
    Netherlands Israel  Spain  
Diff. w/ 
NL 
Diff. w/  
Spain  
Number 
of Obs.  
1/88 - 5/91  1,649  1,181  1,141  -468 40  20 
11/91- 5/99  1,853  1,398  1,107  -455 291  55 
11/99- 5/2005  2,056  1,728  1,332  -317 407  42 
Data Source: EUROSTAT.     
 
The evidence from a comparison of FOB export prices and CIF import prices for 
Israeli pepper is inconclusive (Table 12). The margin is highest in the first period with 
Agrexco as the only exporter, declines by more than half in the second period, but 
increases again markedly in the third period. However, these large differences in 
margins are not statistically significant. Monthly margins for pepper display a high 
variability, casting doubt on data reliability.  
  
Table 12: Comparison of Unit Values (CIF and FOB) for Israeli Pepper  
(Weighted Average, Nov-May) 
  
Real CIF Prices 
in NIS/mt  
Real FOB Prices 
in NIS/mt     FOB/CIF      CIF-FOB 
(1) 1/88 - 5/91   9,136 7,602  0.83  1,534 
(2) 11/91- 5/99   7,673 7,010  0.91  663 
(3) 11/99 - 3/2005  8,810 7,517  0.85  1,293 
Change (2)/(1)  -16%  -8%  10%  -57% 
Change (3)/(2)  15%  7%  -7%  95% 
Remark: Margins were also calculated based on yearly data. The main difference in the 
results compared to those presented in the table is a larger margin in the last period because of 
a lower FOB unit value.  
Data Sources: EUROSTAT, CBS.  
  
  204. Market Power in Export Markets – Econometric Analysis 
In the discussions preceding the reforms it was argued that the abolition of centralized 
exports would lead to “wild” competition among Israeli exporters, a decrease in prices 
for Israeli products, and shrinking grower profits. In this section we estimate residual 
import demand functions for main Israeli fruits and vegetables. Our objective is to 
examine these claims. 
 
4.1. The Citrus Sector 
In previous research (Kachel and Finkelshtain 1999, Kachel 2003), we analyzed the 
possibility of exercising market power in Israeli citrus exports. The objective was to 
examine whether centralized exports by the CMBI had succeeded to increase export 
revenues. The research focused on orange and grapefruit exports to the UK and 
Germany. It was based on monthly import data for the years 1978 to 1992 for the 
German market and 1978 to 2002 for the British market. 
 
The methodological approach belongs to the school of “New Empirical Industrial 
Organization” (NEIO), that is, firms’ actual behavior is inferred from market data. 
Time series of prices and quantities are analyzed in order to evaluate both the 
potential for market power and the actual exercising of it (Bresnahan 1989, Carlton 
and Perloff 1990). The estimation procedure proceeds as follows. The first step is the 
estimation of the inverse residual import demand functions for different markets and 
different products. This provides the information regarding the possibility of 
exercising market power in the various export markets. If demands are not perfectly 
elastic, there is scope for the exporting firm to use market power and the analysis 
should proceed to the next step. In the second step an equation representing the 
exporter’s behavior is estimated. 
 
We estimated a system of simultaneous equations, employing the method proposed by 
Fair (1970, 1984) to account for simultaneity and serial correlation of residuals. 
Estimation results (Table 13) show that the CMBI as a centralized export institution 
had little scope to exploit its organizational structure to increase revenues in export 
markets. Import demands for Israeli oranges and grapefruits in both the UK and 
Germany are very elastic and provide a very limited potential for exploiting 
monopolistic market power. For Israeli oranges, we estimated an import demand 
elasticity of -4.4 in the UK market and an elasticity of -30 in the German market.
6 For 
Israeli grapefruit imports, the UK demand is more elastic ( 6 . 14 − = η ) compared to 
the demand of the German market ( 9 . 5 − = η ). These differences are consistent with 
differences in market share and with previously published studies of consumer 
preferences in the two markets. The results imply that the CMBI could employ third-
degree price discrimination between the German and British markets. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
6 The coefficient for Israeli orange quantities in the German market is not significant. 




To summarize, we find that despite conditions supporting the presence of market 
power, such as substantial market shares and high brand awareness, the hypothesis 
that the market conduct of the CMBI was competitive is not rejected. These results 
question the claim of supporters of centralized exporting as a means of increasing 
growers’ revenues. 
 
Table 13: Demand for Israeli Citrus in the UK and Germany 
  Oranges - UK 
(Linear Specification) 
Oranges - Germany 
(Linear Specification) 
Explanatory Variables:  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Constant  373.2  16.58  960.0  7.93 
Quantity Israel  -0.0080  -7.83  -0.0034  -1.37 
Quantity Other Suppliers  -0.0075  -9.23  -0.0038  -2.64 
Quantity Easy Peelers  -0.0075  -10.23  -0.0016  -0.63 
Quantity Grapefruit  -0.0074  -3.71  -0.0068  -1.03 
Quantity Israeli Grapefruit  -0.0004  -0.09  0.0020  0.23 
Expenditure Citrus  1.96*10
-5  10.45  2.59*10
-6  1.54 
 
Grapefruit - UK 
(Logarithm. Specification) 
Grapefruit - Germany 
(Logarithm. Specification) 
Explanatory Variables:  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Constant  5.15  7.84  4.38  6.73 
Quantity Israel  -0.0685  -3.44  -0.1706  -4.81 
Quantity Other Suppliers  -0.0603  -2.38  -0.1173  -3.13 
Quantity Easy Peelers  -0.0385  -2.76  -0.0347  -3.60 
Quantity Grapefruit  -0.1352  -3.32  -0.2061  -3.40 
Quantity Israeli Grapefruit  0.0006  0.07  0.0368  2.55 
Expenditure Citrus  0.2126  3.96  0.3929  4.61 
Dependent variables: import prices for the respective market and fruit. Coefficients significant 
at the 5% level are printed in bold. Regressions included additional explanatory variables 
(Dummy and Trend variables) not presented in the table. The R
2 for the presented results 
ranged from 0.76 to 0.90. For more details see Kachel (2003). 
 
4.2. The Avocado Sector 
We employed a similar methodology to analyze Israeli avocado exports. We 
estimated the following inverse demand function for Israeli avocado imports to the 
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where t is the date,   is the import price (unit value) for Israeli avocados,  , 









                                                 
7 Estimation results are not presented here, for details see Kachel (2005). 
8 The estimations are based on data for the months October till April, the main supply season of Israeli 
avocados. 
  22main competitors (Spain and Mexico, respectively),  , a dummy variable for the 
period of liberalized exports, and  , a dummy accounting for an exceptional 
season characterized by extremely low yields in Israel as a result of weather damages. 
lib D
90 / 89 D
 
The regression was estimated with the 2SLS estimation procedure to account for 
simultaneity. Regression results (Table 14) show that Israeli avocado quantities have a 
significant negative influence on the price obtained. The coefficients for quantities of 
competitors are also negative and significant, as expected. The own-price elasticity at 
the sample average is about -5. This suggests a quite elastic demand for Israeli 
avocados and consequently, a limited potential to increase export revenues by 
exercising market power. 
 
Table 14: EU15 Demand for Israeli Avocados 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient   t-value
Israeli Quantity in mt  -0.061  -4.64 
Dummy for Liberalization (Constant) -30.24  -0.20 
Dummy for Liberalization (Slope)  0.024  0.90 
Quantity of Spain  -0.04  -2.65 
Quantity of Mexico  -0.03  -2.33 
Lagged Israeli CIF Price (t-1)  0.58  8.36 
Dummy for Season   1988/89  89.77  0.81 
Constant 975.3  6.65 
R
2   0.83    
Number of Obs.  105    
Dependent variable: import prices for Israeli avocados. The equation was estimated using 
instrumental variable regression (2SLS) with robust STD. We tested for autocorrelation of 
residuals with the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test; test results indicate that 
residuals are not correlated. 
Coefficients significant at the 5% level are printed in bold.  
 
To account for possible changes in residual import demand as a result of export 
liberalization, we included a dummy for liberalization as fixed effect and as a slope 
shifter. For example, the demand for Israeli avocados might decrease after 
liberalization as a result of granting export licenses to additional exporters because of 
increasing transaction costs or decreasing expenditure for promotion. Regression 
results indicate that there was no significant change in the level or slope of the 
residual demand function after liberalization. 
 
Overall, conclusions are similar to those obtained for citrus exports. Despite large 
market shares, the price elasticity for Israeli avocados is high, limiting the scope to 
exploit market power. Also for avocados, the estimation of a behavioral equation 
indicates that the existing market power was not exploited by the single-desk 
exporter.
9 
                                                 
9 Estimation results are not presented here because of space constraints but can be obtained from the 
authors upon request. 
  234.3. The Pepper Sector 
Regression results for Israeli pepper exports to the EU did not show any evidence of 
Israeli supply quantities influencing prices obtained. This is not surprising given that 
the market share of Israeli pepper in the EU market is small. This result provides 
evidence that no gains are to be expected from one-hand exports with regard to the 
possibility of price discrimination and an increase in export revenues. On the other 
hand, it indicates that Israeli pepper exports can still be increased with no negative 
influence on the price level in the EU export market. There are indications that EU 
import data for Israeli pepper may not be completely reliable, hence the results for 
pepper have to be interpreted with caution.  
 
5. The Market for Export Services – Econometric Analysis 
One of the dangers of privatization in general, and particularly in the market for 
export services for agricultural products, is the possibility that the state monopoly will 
be replaced by a private monopoly or oligopoly which can exploit its power to 
decrease grower revenues. In this case, the efficiency gains from privatization may be 
smaller than the damage caused by the noncompetitive market structure of the 
privatized sector. We use econometric methods to analyze the functioning of the 
market for export services after the reforms. 
 
In the econometric analysis for avocado and pepper, FOB prices (collected by the 
CBS) are explained by CIF prices (EUROSTAT unit values) and additional variables. 
CIF and FOB prices differ mainly by the costs of shipping the product from the border 
of the export country to the border of the import country. These costs are largely fixed 
on a per unit basis and do not depend on the price of the product. There are some costs 
(e.g. insurance) which are calculated as a percentage of the price but these costs 
account only for a very small share of the price. Under perfect competition, we expect 
the changes in CIF prices to be transmitted in full to the growers; hence the coefficient 
of the CIF price is expected to be close to one. In this case, the constant is expected to 
be negative and indicate transportation and insurance costs. If the coefficient of the 
CIF price is significantly smaller than one, this is an indication that changes in CIF 
prices are not fully translated to changes in FOB prices. For the period before 
liberalization, this may be an indication of cross-subsidization practiced by the 
monopoly exporter. For the period after liberalization, this may be an indication that 
the market for export services is not competitive. 
  
5.1. The Avocado Sector 
Avocado CIF and FOB prices were analyzed with the help of three regressions, one 
for all observations (1988-2005), one with data for the period before export 
liberalization (1988-Apr 1998), and one for the period since liberalization (Oct 1998-
2005). High R
2 values (0.6 to 0.7) indicate that a large part of the variation in FOB 
prices is explained by the variables included in the regressions (Table 15). The 
  24estimated coefficients for the CIF price for all three regressions are smaller than 0.7 
and statistically significantly different from 1. This result indicates that changes in 
CIF prices are not fully translated to FOB prices. Regression results suggest that the 
reform did not much influence the way CIF prices are related to FOB prices. Constant 
and slope dummies for the regression, including all observations, are not significant. 
In addition, the coefficients of the CIF price are identical in the second and third 
regression. 
 
Table 15: Price Equation for Avocado from Israel  
(Dependent Variable: FOB Price)  
OLS AR(1)  Correction  
Explanatory Variables  Coefficient   t-value  Coefficient   t-value 
All Observations (10/88 - 3/05)         
CIF Price  0.64  11.64  0.67  7.45 
Dummy for Liberalization (Constant)  156.7  0.20  790.1  0.74 
Dummy for Liberalization (Slope)  -0.003  -0.03  -0.08  -0.56 
Constant 876.6  2.06  602  0.90 
R
2   0.61     0.68    
DW 1.23     1.45    
Before Liberalization (10/88 - 4/98)          
CIF Price  0.63  10.2  0.66  6.01 
Constant 876.6  1.81  709  2.12 
R
2   0.61     0.70    
DW 1.07     1.12    
After Liberalization (10/98 - 3/2005)         
CIF Price  0.63  8.68      
Constant  1,033  2.08      
R
2   0.62         
DW 1.69          
 
5.2. The Pepper Sector 
In contrast to the avocado sector, the R
2 for the estimated pepper price equations is 
much lower (less than 0.2). One reason for the large unexplained variation in FOB 
prices may be changes in the transportation technology (a move to sea transport from 
air transport), or changes in transport costs; however, the main reason is likely to be 
problems with the quality of the price data in the pepper sector. In the case of pepper, 
the coefficients for the CIF price are lower than 0.5, an even larger departure from the 
expected value close to 1. It is important to note that the price coefficient increased in 
the last period, which is characterized by significant entry into pepper export 
operations. This result suggests an increase in competition in the market for pepper 
export services.  
 
  25Table 16: Price Equation for Pepper from Israel (Dependent Variable: FOB Price)  
All Observations First and Second    Third Period 
Explanatory Variables  ) 1/88-3/05 (  Period (1/88-5/99)  (11/99-3/05) 
   Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value
CIF Price  0.337  4.75  0.304  3.60  0.416  3.09 
Dummy for "Arava" exporter  435  1.05             
Dummy for additional exporters  -264  0.82 -              
Constant  4,439  6.69  5,027  7.57  3,970  3.44 
R
2   0.18     0.16     0.20    
DW 1.7     1.75     1.62    
  
5.3. The Citrus Sector 
The Israeli citrus industry after liberalization is characterized by a highly concentrated 
export sector. In the first years after liberalization, three or four main exporters 
exported about 90% of all Israeli citrus. In recent years, there has been a duopoly of 
two main exporters responsible for about 90% of exports, and in addition, a number of 
small exporters. The high concentration of the sector for citrus export services raises 
concerns that exporters may exploit market power in their transactions with citrus 
growers.  
 
Contracts offered by exporters differ in the degree of information provided to growers 
about the final price for their fruit. For example, exporters may agree to pay a certain 
price, or they may pay growers just after selling the fruit abroad without any 
guarantee on price (consignment contract) and with very limited possibilities for 
growers to evaluate the performance of exporters. In contrast to textbook contract 
theory which predicts contracts with profit-sharing, during most of the 90s, the 
common contract in the Israeli citrus industry was consignment-based. In recent years, 
it has become common to offer a minimum price. 
 
In previous research, we developed a model characterizing contract choice in the 
Israeli citrus industry (Kachel et al. 2003, Kachel 2003). The citrus market for export 
services is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, each of the exporters 
chooses, noncooperatively, the type of contract offered to growers. In the second 
stage, given the contract type chosen in the first stage, exporters engage in price 
competition. The model shows that exporters may decrease price competition among 
themselves by limiting the amount of price information provided to growers in the 
offered contracts.  
 
Empirically, we find that there is a very weak relationship between the price that 
export firms pay growers and the share of each exporter in citrus fruit supplied by 
growers. Low price elasticities are characteristic for a market with very little price 
information where growers choose exporters randomly or based on factors other than 
price. In addition, the analysis of price margins in grapefruit and orange exports 
indicates a substantial oligopolistic markup of exporters, decreasing grower prices and 
contributing to a decline in citrus production in the longer term. 
  266. Summary and Conclusions 
We studied the influence of far-reaching reforms in main agricultural export sectors in 
Israel on the performance of those sectors. The reforms included the abolition of 
statutory export monopolies, and the privatization of export operations. A comparison 
of the three sectors studied shows differences in the development of exports. Citrus 
exports continued to decrease after the reforms, and the overall performance of the 
sector did not improve. Avocado exports decreased slightly after the reforms, while 
other fruit exports have begun to increase in recent years. In contrast, pepper exports 
increased markedly after the reforms, which induced the expansion of pepper 
production and the entry of numerous new exporters.  
 
It seems that the differences in performance are mainly related to demand conditions 
in export markets. In addition, entry barriers influence the speed of adaptation to 
changing market conditions. The vegetable sector is characterized by low entry 
barriers to production (annual growing cycle) and export (packing operations are 
mainly owned by growers). In contrast, fruit production is characterized by a multi-
annual production cycle and higher investments, which slow the speed of the 
adaptation process. In addition, packing stations in the citrus sector were initially 
owned mainly by export companies - creating an additional entry barrier into citrus 
exports. In the avocado sector, growers (kibbutzim) own the main packing stations. A 
large segment of the avocado growers are organized in a common organization and 
may be able to obtain higher revenues through joint bargaining. A relatively higher 
price transmission in avocado exports compared to citrus and pepper exports may be 
an indication of this. 
 
Results are clear-cut with regard to the question of whether the opening of export 
operations to competition caused a loss of market power in export markets. First, there 
is no indication that prices for Israeli products declined after reforms relative to those 
of its competitors. On the contrary, relative import prices for pepper and grapefruit 
improved, probably indicating an improvement in quality. In addition, we estimated 
residual import demand functions for Israeli products to formally investigate the 
possibility of exploiting market power on export markets. Estimation results show that 
avocado and citrus supplies from Israel have a significant but small influence on 
obtained prices. Import demand is very elastic and therefore, the potential to exploit 
market power is quite limited. Econometric results for behavioral equations indicate 
that centralized exports did not manage to take advantage of this limited potential. To 
summarize, we find that despite conditions supporting the presence of market power, 
such as substantial market shares and high brand awareness, the hypothesis that the 
market conduct of the CMBI was competitive is not rejected. These results raise some 
question as to the claim of supporters of centralized exporting as a means of 
increasing growers’ revenues. 
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the efficiency of export operations and led to a saving of marketing costs. We 
compared import to export prices and found that the margin decreased substantially 
after reforms in the case of avocado exports. For grapefruit, results obtained here 
contradict those in an earlier study (Kachel 2003), probably due to different time 
periods and data sources. For pepper, the differences observed in the margins in three 
distinct periods are not significant. A large variability in margins over time, especially 
for pepper exports, casts some doubt on data reliability. In addition, the price margin 
we calculated from the available unit value data contains just part of the marketing 
costs (mainly overseas transportation and insurance). 
 
The high concentration of exports in the hands of just a few exporters, especially in 
the citrus and avocado sectors, raises some concern as to the noncompetitiveness of 
the export services market for agricultural products and the exporters' ability to 
exploit their power to decrease grower revenues. Previous theoretical research by the 
authors showed that exporters can use information as a strategic tool to reduce price 
competition among them. Our model predicts that exporters will use consignment 
contracts to conceal price information, reduce price competition and pay lower grower 
prices. Empirical research confirms that the market structure for export services in the 
citrus sector is noncompetitive. The analysis for avocado and pepper provides a first 
indication that also in these sectors, export services may be noncompetitive; however, 
further research is necessary. 
 
To summarize, research results indicate that the impact of reforms on export 
performance and growers' revenues may have been dampened by the noncompetitive 
market structures for export services that developed after the reforms. In addition, 
performance depends on additional factors which may dominate the effects of reform. 
In the pepper sector, which shows an impressive export performance in the years after 
the reform, exports are relatively less concentrated than those in the less successful 
citrus and fruit sectors. But it appears that the main reason for success in this sector 
was the introduction of production methods for high-quality pepper which can be 
supplied to European markets during periods of lower domestic supply.  
  
There is a need for further reforms to increase competitiveness in the market for 
export services. These reforms should include abolition of the partial exemption for 
wholesalers (including exporters) from the enforcement of antitrust laws, if these 
wholesalers are not owned by growers. In addition, regulations are necessary to 
increase transparency and fairness in the exporters' transactions with growers.  
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